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STEPHANOS BIBAS

The Story of Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial
Gamesmanship Toward The Search for
Innocence?
Stephanos Bibas*
Brady v. Maryland1 is unusual among the great landmark criminal procedure decisions of
the Warren Court. Brady requires prosecutors to give criminal defendants evidence that tends to
negate their guilt or reduce their punishment. In other words, Brady mandates limited discovery
instead of trial by ambush. Brady’s test turns not on whether the prosecutor misled a jury or
acted in good faith, but on whether the evidence is favorable and material to guilt or punishment.
Thus, Brady marked a potentially revolutionary shift from traditionally unfettered adversarial
combat toward a more inquisitorial, innocence-focused system. Yet, unlike Mapp v. Ohio2 and
Miranda v. Arizona,3 Brady has sparked little public controversy or commentary. This may be
because innocence is an appealing touchstone for criminal procedure, one with enormous
potential to transform the adversarial criminal trial into a collaborative search for the truth.
Brady, however, has meant much less in practice than it could have. Few potential Brady
claims come to light, and fewer defendants walk free, because our system remains an adversarial
contest rather than a neutral inquiry into innocence. First, Brady requires prosecutors to look
out for defendants’ interests, and adversarial-minded prosecutors are poorly suited to do that job.
Second, Brady is hard to implement and enforce. Favorable evidence is often spread across many
agencies’ files; defendants cannot learn of evidence hidden in these files; and judges are loath to
reverse convictions long after trial. Empirical evidence shows that few Brady claims succeed and
that most Brady material is ambiguous enough that prosecutors can easily overlook it. Third,
Brady requires relatively little discovery, though statutes and rules have broadened discovery
beyond the constitutional minimum. Much broader discovery would alleviate many of the
adversary system’s problems, at the cost of more witness intimidation, fabricated alibis, and
revelation of undercover and confidential informants. Fourth, Brady applies only at the trial
stage, but hardly any defendants go to trial any more. About 95% plead guilty, and Brady may
not even apply to the plea bargaining process, when defendants need this information most.
Finally, though Brady ignores the prosecutor’s good faith (mens rea), its test continues to require
*Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. B.A., Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. E-mail:
bibas@philo.org. I am grateful to David Baldus, Todd Pettys, and Tung Yin for their comments on earlier drafts and
to Jordan Esbrook, Brian Raimondo, and Robert Zink for their research assistance.
1373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2367 U.S. 643 (1961) (requiring exclusion from criminal proceedings of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
3384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to warn suspects in custody of their rights to remain silent and to consult
with an attorney before questioning them).
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some prosecutorial misdeed (actus reus). It does not focus exclusively on the defendant’s guilt or
innocence of the crime or punishment.
Brady’s ringing rhetoric of innocence, then, is in some ways a hollow promise. Far from
transforming the adversarial system into a quest for truth, it has merely tinkered at its margins.
The Tradition of Adversarial Criminal Procedure
In much of continental Europe, magistrates and judges actively seek out evidence and
question witnesses, even the defendant himself. This approach is known as the inquisitorial
system, because judges themselves inquire directly into the truth of the case. Judges find both the
facts and the law, and they can hop back and forth between digging up evidence and witnesses
and hearing the testimony of those witnesses. Thus there is no separation between discovery and
trial, and the parties cannot question or coach witnesses before judges take their testimony.
While they may begin by hearing the evidence and witnesses proposed by either side, they may
also pursue other leads, including names mentioned by witnesses. Thus judges, rather than
prosecutors, run the show. Their job is to develop a full picture of the evidence that bears on
guilt or punishment, not simply the case presented by either side. The English, however, rejected
the inquisitorial system, as it reminded them of the Spanish Inquisition and the Star Chamber,
which had used torture to extract confessions. Instead, England entrusted fact-finding to lay
juries who heard the arguments of each party. Crime victims dug up their own evidence and
witnesses and argued their own cases in court, and criminal defendants brought in their own
evidence and defended themselves in court. Laymen, not lawyers, ran the system, which sharply
divided pre-trial discovery from trial testimony.4
By the late eighteenth century, lawyers had taken over the criminal process. Public
prosecutors (appointed or paid for by the state) took the place of victims, and criminal defense
lawyers took the place of defendants who could afford them. The lawyers investigated the
evidence before trial and then questioned witnesses at trial in front of juries. Prosecutors came to
see police officers almost as their clients and worked closely with them to dig up evidence and
witnesses and prepare witnesses’ testimony for trial. Now that lawyers ran the show, judges could
develop rules of procedure and evidence to regulate trials. Judges guarded the procedural fairness
of trials but left substantive questions of guilt or innocence to juries. The adversarial system
trusted that, if each side fought hard to present its own arguments, the truth would emerge from
the collision of truth and error. The American colonies inherited this adversarial criminal
process from England.
Each lawyer, then, was supposed to be a zealous partisan rather than a neutral arbiter of
truth. The main limit on zealous advocacy was that lawyers were in some sense officers of the
court. As such, they could not lie to or mislead the tribunal. Short of falsehood, however,
lawyers were free to advance their own clients’ interests and to leave issues of ultimate truth to
the jury. If a fact hurt one’s client or weakened an argument, that lawyer was under no

4I draw the account in this and the next paragraphs from the work of John Langbein. See generally John H.
Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (2003).
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obligation to find or disclose it; it was the opposing lawyer’s job to do that. Thus, the parties did
not have to reveal information to each other in discovery.
In theory, prosecutors hold themselves to even higher ethical standards. Prosecutors do
not have human clients, but rather represent the State in its quest for justice. As the Supreme
Court stated in 1935, the prosecutor "is the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose interest . . .
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor–indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."5 If the adversarial trial remains a boxing match, at
least the prosecutor must fight by the Marquis of Queensbury rules and avoid striking below the
belt. Thus, beginning in 1935 with Mooney v. Holohan, the Supreme Court adopted narrow due
process limits on prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors must not elicit testimony that they know
is perjurious or misleading, because doing so would "deliberate[ly] dece[ive] court and jury."6
Fundamentally, though, the prosecutor remains an adversary, a boxer rather than a
referee. If prosecution is a mere game or a sporting event, prosecutors may feel entitled to fight
to win at all costs. Prosecutors are the heirs to the partisan role of victims, whom they
supplanted. Their incentives also push them toward maximizing convictions: if they rack up
many wins and few losses, they receive promotions or lucrative jobs in private practice.7 Though
conscientious prosecutors also want to free the innocent and show mercy on sympathetic guilty
defendants, at root, they see their job as convicting and punishing the guilty. This adversarial
mindset may endanger the quest for truth. Partisan prosecutors may conclude early on that
defendants are guilty and so fail to see or discount the importance of later evidence that
undercuts their case. And because partisan lawyers find and prepare witnesses, they may
consciously or unconsciously coach them to slant their stories and omit unfavorable details. In
particular, they may leave out crucial details that might contradict or impeach a witness’s
testimony. Or, lawyers may simply avoid calling witnesses who undercut their theory of the case.
Unless the adversary system works perfectly and the other side finds all of the damaging
information on its own, the jury will not hear the crucial damaging evidence. Defense counsel,
however, often are underfunded and lack the broad subpoena powers and investigative agencies
to which prosecutors have access. In addition, each side may not know the evidence and
witnesses that the other will use, so each is in a poor position to investigate and poke holes in the
other’s evidence. Moreover, witnesses sympathetic to the defendant or victim may refuse to talk
to opposing counsel, which impedes investigating the weaknesses in witnesses’ stories. As a
result, each side often will not find on its own the helpful evidence possessed by the other side.

5Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935) (reversing criminal conviction in part because the prosecutor
had misstated facts, assumed facts not in evidence, badgered witnesses, and proclaimed personal opinion in closing
argument).
6Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam); see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 265, 267,
269-70 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) (per curiam) (reversing conviction because prosecutor
knowingly elicited and failed to correct testimony that "gave the jury [a] false impression" even though it may have
been technically truthful); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
7See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463, 2471-72 (2004).
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John Brady’s Crime
John Brady was a twenty-five-year old man who had bounced around from job to job. He
had fallen in love with another man’s wife, Nancy Boblit Magowan, and now she was expecting
their child. Brady was broke but felt he had to come up with money to take care of Nancy and
their child. On June 22, 1958, Brady had written her a post-dated check for $35,000 and
promised her that he would come up with that money in the next two weeks.8
Together with Nancy’s brother, Donald Boblit, Brady hatched a scheme to rob a bank.
But to pull off the robbery, they needed a fast, reliable car. Brady suggested that they steal the
new Ford Fairlane that his friend William Brooks had just bought. So, late on June 27, 1958,
Brady and Boblit placed a log across the road near Brooks’ home and waited for him to return
home from work. When Brooks pulled up and got out of his car to move the log, one of the men
hit him over the head with a shotgun, knocking him unconscious. Brady and Boblit put him into
the back seat and stole his wallet, and Brady drove them to a secluded field ten miles away. The
two men walked Brooks to a clearing at the edge of the woods, and one of the men strangled
Brooks to death with a shirt. They both carried his corpse farther into the woods and left it
there. The key issue in the case turned out to be the identity of the actual killer. Who had
strangled Brooks–Brady or Boblit?
The Confessions
Brady later gave a series of statements to the police. In his first two statements, Brady
said that he, not Boblit, had stolen the car, hit Brooks over the head with a pipe, loaded him into
the back seat, and dumped him elsewhere. He made no mention of any murder or death.9 In
Brady’s third statement, he asserted that after the two of them had stolen the car, Boblit had hit
Brooks over the head. Boblit, he claimed, had suggested killing Brooks over Brady’s opposition
and had strangled Brooks as Brady stood by silently. He claimed that he had agreed to take the
blame for Boblit.10 In his fourth statement, Brady said that he and Boblit had agreed that Boblit
would have to kill Brooks. Although Boblit had wanted to shoot him, Brady had suggested
strangling him. Once again, Brady admitted that he had stood by silently.11 At trial, Brady
"admitted virtually everything set forth in his confessions"12 but denied having personally killed
Brooks.13
Boblit also gave a series of statements to the police, and in all but one of them he accused
Brady of doing the actual killing. In the first and second statements, Boblit said that he had
helped Brady to rob Brooks but had not known that Brady would kill him. In both statements,
he claimed that Brady had committed the actual killing. In the second statement, Boblit added
8I draw the facts in this and the next paragraph from Richard Hammer, Between Life and Death 15-52 (1969).
9Id. at 85, 87.
10Id. at 103-07.
11Id. at 111-12.
12Brady v. State, 154 A.2d 434, 435 (Md. 1959).
13Brady v. State, 160 A.2d 912, 913 (Md. 1960), rev’d and remanded, 174 A.2d 167 (Md. 1961), aff’d, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
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that Brady had hit Brooks with a gun and that Boblit had told Brady not to kill him.14 Boblit’s
third and fourth statements repeated the second one, except that Boblit admitted that he and
Brady had both thought that "Brooks had to be killed."15
The key confession at the heart of Brady v. Maryland was Boblit’s fifth statement, made
on July 9, 1958. In that statement, Boblit admitted that he, not Brady, had hit Brooks on the
head with the shotgun. He also said that after they got back into the car, he had planned to
shoot Brooks, but Brady had persuaded him to strangle him instead. Boblit had strangled him, he
admitted, and both men had carried his corpse into the woods.16
In short, both men repeatedly admitted to taking part in the robbery and murder, but
each at times blamed the other for the actual killing. This disagreement was irrelevant to guilt
but possibly relevant to whether one or the other deserved the death penalty.
Lower Court Proceedings
Before trial, Brady’s lawyer asked the prosecutor for any confessions that Brady or Boblit
had made. The prosecutor turned over Boblit’s other statements but did not turn over Boblit’s
July 9 statement, in which he had admitted doing the actual killing.17
Brady and later Boblit were convicted at jury trials and sentenced to death. Afterwards,
Brady’s new lawyer read the transcript of Boblit’s trial and learned of the July 9 statement, which
Brady’s trial lawyer had never received. He filed a collateral attack, requesting a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed. It held that "the suppression or withholding by the State of material evidence
exculpatory to an accused is a violation of due process."18 Even though Brady did not claim that
the prosecutor had acted out of "guile," the prosecutor’s guile is irrelevant to the due process
violation.19 Though it seriously doubted whether Boblit’s confession would have done Brady any
good, the court gave Brady the benefit of the doubt. It refused to order a new trial on the issue of
guilt, as the withheld evidence cast no doubt on that issue. Instead, the court remanded for a
new trial solely to determine punishment.20

14Hammer, supra note 8, at 97-98.
15Id. at 100.
16Id. at 114-15.
17Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). The State’s Attorney claimed that he had never turned over any of
Boblit’s statements, but the courts appear to have credited Brady’s lawyer’s claim that he had received Boblit’s other
statements. See id.; Hammer, supra note 8, at 259-60.
18174 A.2d 167, 169 (Md. 1961).
19Id.
20Id. at 171-72. Today, courts bifurcate death-penalty trials into one phase on guilt and another one (or two) on
punishment, but at the time the idea of a punishment mini-trial was novel.

THE STORY OF BRADY V. MARYLAND

6

In the Supreme Court
Brady petitioned for certiorari, seeking a new trial on both guilt and punishment. The
Fourteenth Amendment ’s Due Process Clause, he contended, entitled him to use Boblit’s
statement throughout the trial to sway the jury, which might even have persuaded it to acquit.21
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. Writing for the majority, Justice
Douglas "h[e]ld that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 22
Brady did not further define materiality. But later cases held that evidence is material if
there is "a reasonable probability" that disclosing it would have changed the outcome of the
proceeding. "A ‘reasonable probability’ [is] ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.’"23 Brady also defined the reach of exculpatory evidence narrowly, as evidence that
would tend to negate guilt or reduce punishment. Giglio v. United States expanded Brady’s rule to
include evidence that would tend to impeach government witnesses,24 such as payments to
witnesses or promises of leniency.
The point of due process, the Brady Court stated, is not to punish prosecutorial misdeeds
but to give defendants fair trials.25 Even though Brady’s prosecutor had not acted out of "guile,"
his actions had denied Brady’s right to a fair trial.26 In other words, prosecutors can violate due
process even if they lack any mens rea and act in good faith. As the Court later put it, "[i]f the
suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the
evidence, not the character of the prosecutor."27 The Brady Court accepted the Court of
Appeals’ holding that under state law, the suppressed evidence would not have been admissible
on the issue of guilt. Thus, the Court affirmed.28

21Brady also invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 373 U.S. at 90-91. Future
similarly situated defendants, Brady argued, would be able to use exculpatory evidence throughout their trials, and so
he should have been able to do the same. Though Brady made this his lead argument, it was opaque. Neither the
majority nor Justice White’s concurrence devoted any space to it, presumably because the evidence would have been
inadmissible as to guilt in any event.
22373 U.S. 83, 87.
23United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984));
see also id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the test set forth in
the first of the two sentences quoted in the text).
24405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972). Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), had foreshadowed this rule by extending
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) to impeachment evidence, though Napue’s holding was limited to
"knowing[] use [of] false evidence" or allowing that evidence to go uncorrected. See 360 U.S. at 265, 267, 269-70.
25Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (discussing Mooney, the seminal due process case in this area).
26Id.
27United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).
28Brady, 373 U.S. at 90-91.

7

STEPHANOS BIBAS

Justice White concurred in the judgment. He pointed out that it was not clear whether
the Maryland Court of Appeals had relied on the Maryland or Federal Constitution.29
Moreover, the State had not cross-petitioned to challenge the due process holding below.
Accordingly, the only issue properly before the Court was whether the Federal Constitution
guaranteed Brady a new trial on guilt as well as punishment. Having decided that Brady had no
such right, the majority should not have reached the broader due process issue, and its whole due
process "hold[ing]" amounted to dictum.30 Finally, the majority’s sweeping opinion created a
broad new rule of criminal discovery. The majority, he argued, should have left the scope of the
right to legislation and rule-making in the first instance.31
Life After Death Row
After the Supreme Court affirmed, Brady was in limbo. He had a right to a new trial
limited to the question of punishment. But he did not want to exercise this right, lest the jury
again sentence him to death. The State had a right to retry Brady, but it had never conducted a
punishment-only trial and was not sure how to do it. So for years neither side made a move.
Brady was transferred off death row and housed in a series of prisons and jails and took part in a
work-release program during the daytime. After fifteen years, his lawyers figured that the State’s
evidence had decayed too much to retry Brady, so they finally moved for a speedy trial. Rather
than retry Brady, the Governor commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. After eighteen
years, Brady was paroled.32
While on death row, Brady had married a Baltimore nurse. After his release, the two had
several children before divorcing. Brady then moved south, married again, and started another
family. He remains steadily employed as a truck driver and has not been in serious trouble with
the law before or since the Brooks murder. He remains sorry that the murder occurred but
maintains that he never intended to kill Brooks, who had been his friend.
Brady’s Overbreadth
While Brady himself retired into obscurity, the Supreme Court case bearing his name
eventually became famous for what seemed to be its sweeping holding. Justice Douglas’s majority
opinion went much further than was necessary to resolve Brady’s case. First, Justice White is
correct that the majority’s famous "hold[ing]" was no more than dictum. Second, Brady’s
prosecutor never denied that he had possessed Boblit’s July 9 statement and had known about it
29Id. at 91 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
30Id. at 92 ("[T]he due process discussion by the Court is wholly advisory"); accord id. at 92 n.1 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with Justice White that the majority’s due process discussion was unnecessary); see id. at 87
(majority opinion) ("We now hold that . . . .").
31Id. at 92 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Black, dissented. They were uncertain about whether Boblit’s statement would
have been admissible as to Brady’s guilt under Maryland law, and so whether there was an equal protection violation.
Thus, they preferred to vacate and remand for further proceedings in light of the governing constitutional principle
set forth by the majority. Id. at 92-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32The information in this paragraph and the next one comes from Telephone Interview with Clinton Bamberger,
counsel in the Supreme Court for John Brady (Mar. 3, 2005).
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all along. Indeed, he had repeatedly tried to use that same statement at Boblit’s trial.33
Moreover, when Brady’s lawyer had asked for Boblit’s statements, the prosecutor had turned over
the other four statements but not the fifth one.34 This selective discovery created the misleading
impression that there were no others. Given this evidence of mens rea, it is odd that the
Supreme Court made its rule "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 35
Third, because the due process "hold[ing]" was on a point not briefed nor contested by either
party, the Court lacked the benefit of a developed adversarial record. As Justice White notes,
perhaps the Court should not have defined this sweeping new right on its own in the first
instance. If its holding had been more modest, legislatures, the bar, and lower courts could have
experimented and developed the precise contours of this new right. In short, Justice White’ s
suggestion of judicial activism is largely correct. Justice Douglas’s majority opinion reached far
beyond the questions presented and actual facts to create a broad new due process right.
The Emphasis on Innocence
To say that a decision is activist, however, is not to say that it is wrong. Brady came in
the 1960s, a decade in which the Court created many broad new criminal-procedure protections.
Many of these other decisions sparked great controversy and resistance. Mapp v. Ohio,36 for
example, led to decades of case law expanding and then narrowing the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, often over bitter dissents. Miranda v. Arizona37 became famous and infamous,
and Congress passed legislation in an unsuccessful effort to overturn the Miranda warning
requirement.38
In contrast, Brady elicited hardly a peep of protest. This difference, I suspect, has to do
with innocence. Mapp and Miranda let guilty criminal defendants walk free, in order to protect
broader constitutional principles and values and punish or regulate police misconduct. Suddenly,
guilty criminal defendants were the good guys and police were the bad guys, a flip-flop that many
people resented. As crime rose in the turbulent 1960s, courts that freed guilty criminal
defendants on technicalities seemed to be part of the problem. Richard Nixon successfully
campaigned for president against the Warren Court and appointed Warren Burger Chief Justice,
partly because Burger was hostile to criminal procedure technicalities.39
Innocence, however, is not a technicality tangential to the criminal process. It is the
main touchstone of the criminal process. The justice system must not only strive to convict the
guilty but also to acquit the innocent. If it mistakenly convicts the wrong person, it inflicts a
33Hammer, supra note 8, at 237.
34Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
35373 U.S. at 87.
36367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38See Title II, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 90th Cong,., 2d Sess., 82
Stat. 210 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501). The Supreme Court declared this statute ineffective to
abrogate Miranda in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
39See Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court 4, 6-7 (1979).
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grave injustice while leaving the guilty party free to commit more crimes. Due process is not
simply about punishing prosecutors who lie or mislead. Instead of focusing on the prosecutor’s
mens rea, bad faith, or guile, Brady shifts the focus to the defendant’s innocence. Prosecutors
must now take affirmative steps so that the jury can discern the truth.
Moreover, Brady does not let defendants walk free. At most, it requires a new trial, at
which the state will have a second opportunity to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And in
Brady itself there was no danger that the punishment retrial would let Brady or Boblit walk free.
The most that either could hope for was to avoid the death penalty and instead receive a life
sentence. Brady was not innocent of murder, but he could plausibly claim to be innocent of a
murder bad enough to deserve the death penalty. In the 1960s, the tide of judicial and popular
opinion was turning against the death penalty. Some states abolished the death penalty, and
polls showed that at the time only a minority of Americans favored it.40 Courts scrutinized death
sentences far more carefully than other sentences and halted many executions. As a result of
these forces, the flow of executions slowed to a single-digit trickle by 1965, less than two years
after the Supreme Court decided Brady.41
Even today, innocence has the potential to transform criminal procedure. DNA testing
has documented many wrongful convictions of the innocent.42 As a result, the governor of
Illinois halted and later commuted all death sentences in that state.43 In addition, scholars have
highlighted flaws in interrogation and identification procedures and legislatures have considered
increasing funding for defense counsel. As habeas corpus review grows ever narrower, compelling
new evidence of actual innocence can still unlock the door to the courthouse or win executive
clemency.
If one had taken Brady seriously, it would have portended a major shift away from the
traditional adversarial system towards a focus on innocence. This major shift never occurred,
however, because crucial features of Brady and our adversarial system have limited Brady’s impact
upon trials. The remainder of this chapter will explain five basic features of our system that
hobble Brady. First, despite Brady’s exhortation to do justice, prosecutors and police remain
fundamentally adversarial. Second, Brady has a weak enforcement mechanism. Because it depends
upon these partisans to dig through their own files to find information for the other side, Brady
violations rarely come to light. When violations do surface, long after trial, judges are loath to
reverse convictions and order retrials. Third, Brady is limited to exculpatory and impeachment
evidence, rather than the incriminating evidence that is much more common. Brady is a very
narrow discovery rule, and statutes and rules have expanded upon Brady’s discovery, but
nonetheless neither side knows all of the other side’s evidence. Fourth, though plea bargaining
40See Hammer , supra note 8, at 287.
41See id. at 285-86.
42See generally Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly
Convicted (2000).
43See Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
2003, § 1, at 1; Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2000, at A1.
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resolves most cases, Brady is designed for trials and poorly suited to plea bargaining. And finally,
though prosecutorial "guile" is irrelevant, Brady still requires some prosecutorial misconduct and
not simply innocence. In other words, while Brady requires no prosecutorial mens rea, it still
requires some actus reus, some act of withholding favorable evidence.
Adversarial Barriers to Focusing on Innocence
The documented wrongful convictions reveal important flaws in our adversary system.
While funding better defense counsel might prevent some of these errors, others are beyond
defense counsel’s control or capacity to investigate. Police and prosecutors are human, and
humans tend to jump to conclusions and then discount later information that undercuts their
earlier beliefs. Their adversarial mindset conditions them all the more to hypothesize guilt and
then focus on finding corroborating evidence. Thus, police and prosecutors who become too
convinced early on of a suspect’ s guilt may simply fail to appreciate or investigate contrary leads.
Even if they come across exculpatory evidence, they may minimize or not see its significance.44
(In other words, even if they see that the evidence is exculpatory, they may not see how it is
material.) They may thus conclude that because a piece of evidence does not change their own
minds about guilt, it would not change jurors’ minds either and so is not Brady material. This
over-stringent perspective could lead prosecutors to decide that nothing is Brady material unless
it persuades them to dismiss a case, so the rate of Brady disclosures could approach zero.
Prosecutors may also be too willing to believe paid informants who tell them what they want or
expect to hear. In addition, their interrogations and line-ups may subtly communicate what they
expect or hope to find, eliciting false or skewed evidence.
If the adversarial system is the problem, then maybe the inquisitorial system is the
solution. Prosecutors could view their job not as a partisan struggle to convict, but as a neutral,
detached investigation into the truth. Brady v. Maryland appeared to be a step in that direction.
The Court took seriously prosecutorial rhetoric about seeing that justice is done. By obligating
prosecutors to cooperate with defense counsel, the Court cast defense counsel not as enemies of
prosecutors but as partners in the quest for justice. Rather than leaving adversarial combat
unregulated, courts were to actively supervise the search for truth. At least one commentator,
writing shortly after Brady, thought that prosecutors might have to turn over their entire files to
trial judges. These judges would then review all the evidence in camera to find possible Brady
material.45 This move could have been the first step toward a more inquisitorial system, with
active judicial oversight.

44See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that prosecutors naturally tend "to
overlook evidence favorable to the defense, and [have] an incentive . . . to resolve close questions of disclosure in
favor of concealment."). Psychological studies confirm that people tend to interpret new evidence so as to confirm
their initial judgments. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 2098, 2102 (1979); S. Plous,
Biases in the Assimilation of Technological Breakdowns: Do Accidents Make Us Safer?, 21 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1058,
1059 (1991).
45See James M. Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F.R.D. 87, 90-91 (1964). For a modern
proposal to give judges a similar inquisitorial role, see Darryl Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec. 2005).
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As it turned out, judges did not take up this supervisory role. In camera review of all
possible evidence would be extremely time-consuming, and judges are too busy to take on
additional duties voluntarily. Moreover, judges traditionally have not been deeply involved in
criminal cases until right before trial. They do not know the issues and the evidence, so usually
they cannot see what evidence might fit with various possible defense theories of the case. Thus,
they leave the Brady determination of favorable evidence up to the prosecutor, whose mindset is
fundamentally partisan.
Simple exhortations to be neutral or pursue justice cannot transform our adversarial
system into an inquisitorial one. The traditions, culture, and incentives of our adversarial system
are deeply rooted and hard to change. As mentioned, prosecutors receive promotions and better
jobs if they have favorable win-loss records and rack up many convictions. And as discussed
below, most cases are strong and result in convictions, which makes finding or appreciating
evidence of innocence like looking for a needle in a haystack. The press of business does not
encourage this slow, detached rumination over the evidence.
Moreover, prosecutors face off against defense counsel who are paid to be zealous
advocates. The ethical rules require zealous advocacy and rarely penalize overly aggressive
behavior. The defense lawyer’s flesh-and-blood client, of course, asks the lawyer to do whatever
he can to win acquittal or a low sentence. Defense lawyers are not about to turn over inculpatory
evidence to prosecutors, particularly because the privilege against self-incrimination and the
attorney-client privilege forbid many disclosures. If defense lawyers are fighting hard and
concealing their cards, a prosecutor might think, why should I show any more than the bare
minimum of mine? Because the system depends on prosecutorial self-policing, defense counsel
are unlikely ever to learn of Brady violations. And if they do come to light at trial, judges may
treat any error as harmless, as defense counsel winds up with the evidence in time for trial. Thus,
prosecutors do not fear being penalized for violating Brady or interpreting it very narrowly.
The adversarial norms and roles of each side keep reinforcing each other. In America,
unlike England, lawyers serve exclusively on one side or the other of this divide, at least for a
period of years. Thus, pro-prosecution lawyers become full-time prosecutors and pro-defendant
lawyers become full-time defense counsel. Each group of lawyers then works and socializes in
offices filled with like-minded people, which reinforces and polarizes their original leanings. Each
also practices against adversaries who are similarly polarized, which may antagonize and
exacerbate the gulf between them.
Brady’s Weak Enforcement Mechanism
Brady’s enforcement difficulties and weak, retrospective enforcement mechanism
exacerbate these problems. Many different federal, state, and local agencies share overlapping
responsibilities for investigation and prosecution. For any moderately complex conspiracy
spanning several states, half a dozen police and prosecutorial offices may have information
relevant to the case. Defense counsel cannot search these files, and a single prosecutor may not
know about, let alone be able to search, all of them. How far does the Brady obligation go?
Courts have charged prosecutors with the knowledge that is in their offices and their
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investigative agencies,46 but not other jurisdictions’ files. As a practical matter, however,
prosecutors will never learn of much of this material, and it will never come to light.
This problem highlights another one: Brady relies on ineffective prosecutorial self-policing
in the first instance. Because Brady material is hidden in prosecutors’ and police files, defense
lawyers probably will never learn of its existence. Most defendants lack the investigative
resources to dig up Brady material. (The next Section discusses how modern discovery has
alleviated this problem somewhat.)
Furthermore, Brady’s test is a retrospective one. In other words, reviewing courts ask ex
post whether the withheld evidence was material in light of all the evidence presented at trial.
But prosecutors must determine whether evidence is material ex ante, before trial. Because of
the adversary system, prosecutors have a poor sense of the defense’s evidence and theory of the
case until trial. And before trial, prosecutors expect to plea-bargain away most cases, so often
they do not finish investigation and familiarize themselves with the evidence until trial is
imminent. Prosecutors, unfamiliar with their own and the other side’s evidence, have difficulty
forecasting before trial what evidence will in retrospect seem to have been material.
In addition, the only enforcement mechanism is retrospective. If Brady material somehow
does come to light, it most likely surfaces after the time has expired for a motion for new trial or
appeal. Defendants must instead file collateral attacks such as habeas corpus petitions, seeking to
reopen convictions that have already become final. By this time, however, defendants no longer
have a right to court-appointed counsel, so most proceed pro se. Courts are flooded with other
pro se habeas petitions, many of which are frivolous and few of which succeed. The volume of
meritless claims may easily lead courts to view the entire exercise as a waste of time. In other
words, jaded judges find it hard to spot the occasional innocence needle in the haystack.47
The psychology of hindsight exacerbates this problem. Psychologists have noted that
people suffer from an inevitability bias. In other words, once people learn what actually
happened, that outcome seems to have been inevitable all along. Thus, when reviewing
convictions, people discount evidence that might have led to a different outcome, such as an
acquittal.48 A related problem is that of jumping to conclusions: people latch onto the evidence
that they learn first and discount or explain away evidence that conflicts with their initial
46See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (charging the individual prosecutor with "a duty to learn of
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police");
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43, 51, 67 (1987) (requiring Brady disclosure of information in the files of a
government agency that investigates child abuse and neglect); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)
(charging each prosecutor with knowledge of all promises made by other lawyers in the same office, whether or not
the prosecutor had actual knowledge or was negligent).
47See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) ("It must prejudice the occasional
meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is
likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.").
48For a discussion of how this same problem infects retrospective review of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims,
together with citations of the psychological literature, see Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and
After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 1.
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impressions. On habeas, a judge reviews a conviction by a trial court that an appellate court has
also upheld. Judges see trial records that convinced juries of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and they are wary of second-guessing those verdicts. Psychologically, it is easier to discount the
new piece of evidence than to upset the entire factual premise and solemn verdict of the trial.
The intrusiveness of the remedy also makes judges reluctant to upset convictions based
on Brady violations. Retrials before juries are cumbersome and time-consuming. In inquisitorial
justice systems, judges (not juries) find the facts at trial, often based on paper records or dossiers.
The emphasis is not on live, dramatic, in-court testimony before a jury. Thus, if an appellate
court finds an evidentiary error at trial, it can simply fix the error and decide for itself whether
the conviction stands or not. In our adversarial system, however, we claim that juries are the sole
arbiters of facts. If a Brady violation prevented the jury from hearing exculpatory evidence, the
appellate court cannot overtly fix the error, as that would intrude upon the jury’s province.
Instead, it must order an entire new trial, even if years have passed and witnesses have long since
died.
The judge’s temptation is to claim that the evidence was not material to the outcome–
that there is no reasonable probability that the evidence would have produced a different result.
Of course, if the withheld evidence is a DNA test that positively proves innocence, no judge will
block that claim. But then again, a prosecutor would have to be both evil and stupid to bring
such a case in the first place, or not to dismiss it as soon as that evidence came to light. The
much more common Brady situations are ambiguous ones, where a piece of evidence might have
bolstered a claim of reasonable doubt, but there is still much evidence of guilt. The prosecutor
may think the evidence creates only a fleeting doubt as to guilt (and so probably is not material).
Defense counsel, in contrast, might view the doubt as substantial (which probably is material).
Because the two sides read the same evidence through different partisan lenses, each side is
overly confident in its own arguments. If this evidence surfaces on habeas corpus, what is a judge
to do? The judge may not be comfortable ordering a new trial for a defendant who is 85% or
maybe 99% likely to be guilty, particularly if that judge has to run for re-election. The evidence
arguably creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt, but arguably it does not. The judge’s inclination
may be to minimize the evidence’s materiality and so find no Brady violation.
Empirical Evidence of How Rarely Brady Works in Practice
Empirical evidence confirms that, perhaps for these reasons, Brady claims infrequently
succeed. I examined 210 Brady and Giglio cases decided in 2004. Of the sixty-three Giglio
claims, thirteen (20.6%) succeeded (typically meaning a retrial), three others (4.8%) were
remanded for evidentiary hearings, and forty-seven (74.6%) were unsuccessful. Non-Giglio Brady
claims are even less successful. Of the 148 cases in this category, twelve (8.1%) succeeded, eight
(5.4%) were remanded, and 128 (86.5%) were unsuccessful.49 If one combines the two
categories, one finds that twenty-five of 210 claims (11.9%) succeeded, eleven (5.2%) were
remanded, and 174 (82.9%) were unsuccessful.
49On April 3, 2005, my research assistant ran the search SY,DI(Giglio (Brady /3 Maryland) (Brady /s (material claim
exculpatory))) & DA(AFT 12/31/2003) & DA(BEF 1/1/2005). The search returned 214 hits, of which 210 were
relevant. One of the cases contained Giglio and non-Giglio Brady evidence, so it falls into both categories.

14 STEPHANOS BIBAS

My sense as a former prosecutor is that not many cases involve significant Brady material
and that smoking guns are almost unheard of, for otherwise the prosecutor would never have
brought the case. The exception is that government informants and cooperating witnesses can
frequently be impeached with their criminal records and cooperation agreements. But
prosecutors routinely air this information during witnesses’ direct examinations, to comply with
Giglio, and juries very often convict anyway.
Empirical evidence confirms that most Brady and Giglio claims involve not smoking guns
but ambiguous evidence, which prosecutors can easily overlook. My research assistants and I
reviewed 448 Brady and Giglio claims that succeeded or were remanded between 1959 and
August 2004.50 This sample of cases is weighted toward and most comprehensive over the last
decade. Success typically means that the court sent the case back for a new trial. Of these cases,
315 (70.3%) involved exculpatory information while 262 (58.5%) involved impeachment
information. (Some cases involved both). The most common claims involved undisclosed plea
agreements or promises of leniency or immunity to witnesses, which occurred in sixty-four cases
(14.3% of the overall total). Other commonly concealed Giglio information included witnesses’
criminal records (32 cases, 7.1%), financial or other tangible incentives to testify (six cases,
1.3%), witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements unrelated to identification (fifty-four cases,
12.1%), witnesses’ having been hypnotized (nine cases, 2.0%), and other evidence of witness bias
(thirteen cases, 2.9%). In thirty-six cases (8.0%) the Brady material consisted of the
prosecution’s failure to identify or make available witnesses who might have had helpful
information. In twenty-one cases (4.7%) other evidence tended to support an affirmative
defense. Twenty-six cases (5.8%) involved witness statements that related to misdescriptions,
misidentifications, or failures to identify defendants. Seventy-one cases (15.8%) involved
forensic, physical, or documentary evidence, and most of the forensic involved weaknesses in
forensic methodology, failures to test evidence, or evidence that the defendant or victim was
intoxicated during the crime. In about seven of these cases (1.6%) the withheld forensic
evidence strongly supported innocence. In other words, only about one-fourteenth of the
successful or remanded cases fall into the most compelling categories: identification evidence or
strong forensic evidence. Of all the cases in the sample, only twenty-seven (6.0%) persuaded me
that the defendant was likely innocent. (Perhaps that just goes to show how partisan and
jaundiced an ex-prosecutor’s perspective is.)
What is striking to an ex-prosecutor is that, even in the small universe of successful cases,
most of the Brady and Giglio evidence is quite consistent with guilt. Juries often convict in the
face of impeachment evidence, for example. Indeed, in Brady itself the Maryland Court of
Appeals doubted that the identity of the strangler was significant but gave Brady the benefit of
the doubt. From the defense’s perspective this evidence might create a reasonable doubt as to
50I drew these cases from the Capital Defense Network’s lists of successful and remanded Brady claims in the United
States Supreme Court, United States District Court, and state courts, updated through August 2004 (available at
http://www.capdefnet.org/ in the Habeas Assistance and Training directory, WebSite Contents, Constitutional
Issues, Exculpatory Evidence, Successful Brady Cases and Cases Remanded (last visited Apr. 26, 2005)). The lists
attempt to be and appear to be comprehensive.
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punishment, but in the heat of battle prosecutors may not see it that way. Thus, prosecutors can
easily overlook this evidence.
Brady’s Failure to Reach Incriminating Evidence, and Discovery
Another complaint about Brady is that it is limited to exculpatory and impeachment
material. Defendants would prefer discovery that went far beyond Brady in two ways. First, most
defendants have little money and few investigative resources of their own. Appointed defense
counsel are often chronically underfunded, overworked, and of uneven competence.51 Some are
hardly able to function as the vigorous, effective adversaries idealized by the adversary system.
The government, in contrast, has superior resources, more investigative powers, and sometimes
better knowledge of the case. Thus, defendants would like the government not only to turn over
exculpatory material that it already has, but also to investigate and develop other possible
exculpatory leads. In other words, they would prefer a quasi-inquisitorial system, with a neutral
magistrate who is charged with digging up the truth. Due process, however, does not require the
police "to use a particular investigatory tool."52 It does not even forbid the good-faith destruction
of evidence that might be exculpatory.53
Second, defendants would prefer that prosecutors turn over inculpatory as well as
exculpatory evidence. While few cases involve significant exculpatory evidence, all involve
much inculpatory evidence. One chronic complaint about the adversary system is that it
encourages trial by surprise or ambush, in which each side must guess about the other side’s
strength and theory of the case. It is difficult to plan a defense in the dark. Each side would
prefer to know the other’s key contentions and evidence and to research and prepare for them
ahead of time.
Once again, the Supreme Court has refused to require this drastic departure from the
traditional adversarial model. "Whether or not procedural rules authorizing [routine disclosure
of prosecutors’ entire files] might be desirable, the Constitution surely does not demand that
much."54 As a matter of constitutional law, the Court is right: there is no text, history, or
tradition that requires open-file discovery. But, as a matter of policy, the traditional trial by
ambush is troubling, exalting an extreme sporting theory of justice over the quest for truth.

51See Bibas, supra note 7, at 2476, 2479, 2481-82.
52Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988).
53Id. at 58; California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984).
54United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976); accord United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)
(Brady’s "purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to
ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur. Thus, the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to
defense counsel . . . ." (footnotes omitted)); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case"); see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 n.20 (rejecting a defendant’s
right to all evidence that would help trial preparation, because "that standard would necessarily encompass
incriminating evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge of the prosecutor’s entire case would always
be useful in planning the defense.").
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Oddly, since the 1930s criminal discovery has been far more restrictive than civil
discovery. In civil cases, the parties can depose each other’s witnesses, submit interrogatories,
request admissions, and request extremely broad document discovery.55 In criminal cases,
however, most civil discovery devices do not exist. For example, very few states allow pre-trial
depositions, in which each side can question the other side ’s witnesses on the record. This
discovery imbalance seems backwards. Because more is at stake in criminal cases, one might
think that criminal cases would allow even broader discovery. But traditionally, the opposite has
been true.
Brady was part of a larger trend toward requiring more cooperation between the
traditional adversaries. Even though the Constitution did not require it, the federal government
and all states guaranteed defendants more discovery than Brady’s constitutional minimum.
Three years after Brady, for example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 authorized pre-trial
disclosure of defendants’ statements, examination or test results, documents, and tangible
objects. In its current form, Rule 16 is even broader, requiring disclosure of all of these items if
the government intends to use them at trial. It also requires disclosure of the defendant ’s
criminal record and reports of expert witnesses whom the government intends to use at trial.56
Once the case reaches trial, the government must disclose written or recorded statements by
witnesses that relate to the subject of their testimony.57 A majority of states provide similar
discovery. A solid minority of states go even further than the federal rules. They require
disclosure of the names, addresses, and (in some states) even prior statements of witnesses whom
the government intends to call at trial.58
To prosecutors, this unilateral discovery seemed to be lopsided and unfair. After all, if
defendants needed evidence to prepare their defenses, so too did prosecutors. If defendants
needed a preview of the government’s theory of the case, prosecutors needed a preview of the
defense. The common refrain of these critics was that discovery ought to be a two-way street.59
Thus, the pendulum swung again, and procedural rules began to require discovery from
the defense. In 1974, for example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended to
require reciprocal discovery.60 Today, in the federal and many state systems, defendants must
notify prosecutors before trial that they intend to raise certain defenses, such as alibi, insanity, or
55See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30, 33, 34, 36.
56Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1966).
5718 U.S.C. § 3500(a), (B); Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(a).
58E.g., Alaska R. Crim. P. 16(b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.4, 15.1; Ark. R. Crim. P. 17(1); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1);
N.J. Ct. R. 3:13-3(c)(6), (7) (also requiring disclosure of witnesses’ past statements and criminal records)
59One might have thought that the privilege against self-incrimination forbade discovery from defendants. But
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-86 (1970), upheld discovery of a defendant’s alibi defense against a Fifth
Amendment challenge, opening the way for other discovery obligations.
60As the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explained, in the course of proposing the
1974 amendments: "[P]rosecution and defense discovery . . . are related and . . . the giving of a broader right of
discovery to the defense is dependent upon giving also a broader right of discovery to the prosecution." Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1974).
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self-defense. They must also disclose the names of the witnesses who will support these
defenses.61 In addition, if defendants seek documents, books, tangible objects, and expert reports
from the government, they must reciprocate with the same kinds of evidence.62
Brady Is Designed for Trials, Not Plea Bargaining
All of these expansions of discovery have reduced the ambush factor. But in most states,
pre-trial discovery does not reach the evidence defendants want most: the names and statements
of lay fact witnesses, such as eyewitnesses to a crime. Simply opening all prosecutorial and police
files to defense inspection would eliminate trial by ambush, but at a high cost. Prosecutors are
reluctant to disclose this information because they fear a variety of repercussions: Defendants
may kill, intimidate, or bribe government witnesses into staying silent or changing their stories,
particularly in violent, gang, and drug cases. Defendants may tailor their stories and alibis to fit
the evidence. And many government witnesses are undercover agents or confidential
informants. Revealing their names prematurely could not only jeopardize their safety but also
undermine their usefulness in ongoing or future investigations.
In the federal and many state systems, defendants receive witnesses’ names and
statements at or on the eve of trial.63 This trial timing is consistent with Brady’s focus on
"avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused."64 Brady is designed to give juries the information
they need in time to reach accurate verdicts. So long as the defense has these statements shortly
in advance of cross-examination, it can use them to impeach witnesses and prepare the defense
case. (Some pieces of evidence, however, might require investigative follow-up, which would
take longer.) Defendants are therefore less susceptible to trial by ambush. The prosecution may
still be surprised, as the defense usually does not have to reveal its witnesses’ names or statements
until the close of the government’s case.
Trials, however, are the exception rather than the rule. Today, only about 5% of
adjudicated cases go to trial. 95% plead guilty, and most of these pleas result from plea
negotiations and bargains between the prosecution and defense. Brady and discovery rules are
designed to "avoid[] an unfair trial" by informing the jury, on the assumption that there will be a
trial and a jury. Their timing is geared towards trial preparation and cross-examination, not plea
negotiations. Most discovery rules require some prosecutorial disclosures shortly after
indictment, but typically not witnesses’ names and statements until trial.
The parties sometimes choose to supplement this discovery with informal discovery,
giving each other a preview of their proof to facilitate plea bargaining. If, for example, the
prosecution reveals to the defendant that five eyewitnesses saw him commit the crime, he may
see that a trial conviction is inevitable and plead guilty. But informal discovery is sporadic and
61E.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1, 12.2; Alaska R. Crim. P. 16(c)(5); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.2(b); Ark. R. Crim. P. 18.3.
62E.g.., Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b); Ala. R. Crim. P. 16.2, 25.5; Alaska R. Crim. P. 16(c)(4), (6) (expert reports and
physical evidence only); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.4, 15.2(c); Ark. R. Crim. P. 18.2 (reports of medical and scientific tests
only).
63E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2.
64373 U.S. at 87.
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incomplete, and prosecutors are least likely to reveal their cards when they are bluffing with weak
hands.
Because defendants do not have this information in time for plea bargaining, they must
bargain in the dark. Typically, guilty defendants know that they are guilty and have a rough idea
of what witnesses and other proof might link them to the crime. But defendants who are
innocent or were intoxicated or mentally ill at the time of the crime have little knowledge of the
evidence against them. Defendants who may be the most sympathetic may thus be at the
greatest disadvantage in plea bargaining. They may be most susceptible to prosecutorial bluffing.
Some courts tried to extend Brady to plea bargaining, accelerating its timing to require
disclosure in time for bargaining. They reasoned that disclosure was essential to the integrity of
the plea-bargaining process. They contended that defendants needed exculpatory and
impeachment information to make voluntary, knowing, intelligent pleas. And they saw Brady
and Giglio information as necessary to ensure that guilty pleas are accurate and reliable.65
The Supreme Court, however, appears to have rejected these arguments. In United States
v. Ruiz, the Court held that plea bargains may require defendants to waive their rights to
impeachment material.66 In a unanimous opinion, the Court reasoned that defendants have no
right to impeachment information before trial. Brady is designed to prevent juries from being
deceived at trial, the Court reasoned, not to facilitate plea negotiations and tactical decisions.
Thus, this trial right does not apply before trial. Though the Court’s holding is limited to Giglio
impeachment material, much of its reasoning could apply with equal force to classic Brady
exculpatory material.67 True, most states require prosecutors to disclose Brady material at some
point before trial.68 But in the rest of the states, as well as the federal system, plea bargaining can
continue to go on in the dark.
Whether this secrecy is a good or a bad thing depends on why prosecutors want to keep
their cards hidden. If prosecutors bluff despite doubts about factual guilt, then actually innocent
defendants might be convicted instead of persevering to possible acquittal at trial. The tradeoff is
more complex when witnesses die: revealing their deaths may let factually guilty defendants walk
free, but concealing them induces guilty pleas from those who could never have been convicted
at trial.

65See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995); Banks v. United States, 920 F. Supp. 688,
691 (E.D. Va. 1996); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 598-99 (W.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977).
66536 U.S. 622, 628-33 (2002).
67See id. at 629-33 (citing both Brady and Giglio).
68See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from
England, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1379, 1417 n.206 (2000) (cataloguing forty-three states that require Brady disclosures
at some point before trial).
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Often, prosecutors have good reasons to hide their cards besides covering up holes in the
evidence. First, as noted, they fear witness intimidation and tampering and alibi fabrication and
offer plea discounts to avoid these risks. Second, they offer plea discounts to keep undercover
agents and confidential informants from having to testify, so they can develop future cases.
Third, prosecutors want to spare traumatized witnesses, such as child-molestation and rape
victims, from having to relive their victimization. If they can avoid releasing victims’ names,
sexual histories, or accounts of victimization, they plea-bargain cases away to do so. Fourth,
prosecutors may be so overwhelmed with cases that they offer especially generous deals in
exchange for not having to search for discovery. For example, to dispose of the flood of
immigration cases swiftly, federal prosecutors in much of the Southwest offer huge discounts in
exchange for waivers of all rights and immediate pleas.69
In short, prosecutors sometimes have legitimate reasons to buy off discovery rights with
favorable plea bargains, and defendants have good reason to take these deals. Without more
information, we cannot know how often non-disclosure jeopardizes innocent defendants and how
often it simply protects witnesses, saves time and effort, and speeds up cases. Brady simply does
not speak to the issue. Its focus on jury trials leaves plea-bargaining discovery unregulated by the
Constitution.
The odd thing about the plea-bargaining system is that it looks vaguely like an
inquisitorial model, with prosecutors trying unsuccessfully to fill judges’ shoes.70 Prosecutors sift
evidence and make quasi-adjudicatory decisions about whether to charge and what punishments
defendants actually deserve. Prosecutors and defense counsel cooperate and negotiate seemingly
just compromises instead of fighting to complete victory or utter defeat. Yet, at root, prosecutors
and defense counsel still come out of the traditional adversarial culture. They may cooperate
much more than they used to, but at bottom prosecutors still see themselves not as neutral
examiners but as partisan advocates.
Why Require Prosecutorial Misdeeds, Not Just Innocence?
A fifth limit on Brady is that, while it purported to disregard prosecutorial "guile," it
nonetheless required a prosecutor’s wrong rather than just a defendant’s innocence. The Court’s
pendulum has swung back and forth on whether to emphasize the lawyers’ and police’s
blameworthiness, the defendant’s innocence, or some of both. In Mooney it required knowing
prosecutorial use of perjury, but in Brady it treated the prosecutor’s good faith as irrelevant. In
cases involving preservation of possibly exculpatory evidence, however, the Court swung back
again. Arizona v. Youngblood held that destruction of evidence does not violate due process
unless the defendant can prove that the police acted in bad faith.71 The same pendulum has
swung back and forth on the importance of defense counsel’s diligence. In United States v. Agurs
the Court’s materiality test hinged on defense counsel’s actions. A piece of evidence was more
69Id. at 625.
70See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 6 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2124-51
(1998).
71488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); see also California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984).
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likely to qualify as material when defense counsel specifically requested it than when defense
counsel made no request or only a general request.72 But in United States v. Bagley, the Court
rejected the Agurs framework. Bagley applies the same standard of materiality regardless of
whether defense counsel specifically requests a piece of evidence.73 (If, however, the prosecutor
has rebuffed a specific request, a court will be more likely to find that the defense lawyer relied on
the prosecutor’s answer, so good defense lawyers still make specific requests.) In short, the Court
is torn between emphasizing the badness of the lawyers and police and the innocence of the
defendant. It wants both to punish misconduct and to free the innocent, but each goal may
compete with the other. The bottom line today is that prosecutorial mens rea and defense
counsel requests are largely irrelevant (except in destruction-of-evidence cases). But, as we shall
see, prosecutorial misconduct (actus reus) still matters greatly.
If Brady is fundamentally about innocence and not prosecutorial misconduct, why should
it depend on whether the prosecutor happened to have a material fact and withheld it? In other
words, should courts reverse convictions wherever there is significant new evidence of actual
innocence, regardless of whether the police and prosecutor ever found it?
The law focuses on procedural violations rather than substantive innocence in order to
preserve the jury’s privileged place in the adversary system. Recall that judges supervise
procedural issues and juries determine substantive ones. A trial or appellate judge cannot simply
find a defendant innocent or guilty, as that would intrude on the jury’s sacred province. Rather,
the judge usually has to find a procedural error. For example, the judge may rule that the
prosecutor made an improper kind of argument or introduced a prejudicial piece of evidence.
The ordinary remedy is to send the case back for another jury trial. (A judge may, however,
occasionally find that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction or that the interests of
justice require a new trial.) In other words, defendants argue their innocence to juries, but legal
points to judges. A defendant who wants to challenge a conviction after trial or on appeal must
argue that there was a procedural defect in the trial. If the trial or appellate court agrees, the
remedy is a whole new trial, unless the procedural error was not properly preserved or was
harmless.
Judges are human and are most willing to reverse convictions when they think that
defendants may be factually innocent. But claims of factual innocence, by themselves, do not
show any procedural errors in jury verdicts. To persuade, defendants must take claims of factual
innocence and dress them up as procedural errors. For example, they may argue that their
72Compare United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) ("When the prosecutor receives a specific and
relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable."), with id. at 112 (in general-request
or no-request cases, evidence is material "if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist").
73473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (holding that the same standard covers specific requests, general
requests, and no requests: "The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."); id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the test set forth in the first quoted sentence of the previous
parenthetical).
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lawyers were ineffective and that there is a reasonable probability that the jurors would have
acquitted if counsel had made a certain argument. In other words, while doubt about guilt may
sway a judge’s heart, a defendant also needs the hook of a procedural claim to open the
courthouse door.74
In inquisitorial systems, in contrast, judges find both facts and law, without juries and the
elaborate procedures surrounding them. Judges focus on the substantive questions of guilt and
punishment instead of evidentiary and procedural rules. On appeal, defendants can again argue
their innocence. If the trial court neglected to consider a piece of evidence, the appellate court
need not send the case back for trial. It can decide for itself on the paper record whether, in light
of the additional evidence, the defendant is guilty.
Brady claims exemplify the adversary system’s blend of procedural error and substantive
doubts about guilt. The Brady test requires that evidence be both exculpatory and material–
there must be a reasonable probability that it would have led to acquittal or lesser punishment.
But it also requires that the prosecution withheld or suppressed this evidence. Perhaps
prosecutorial withholding is a proxy for very damaging evidence,75 but it is at best an imperfect
proxy. Even though Brady purports to ignore prosecutorial fault, it still requires some
prosecutorial withholding or suppression, whether intentional or not. Under this standard, some
guilty defendants receive windfalls simply because their adversaries goofed, while some innocent
defendants receive no relief because their prosecutors played by the rules. In this way, the
sporting theory of justice lives on.
Conclusion
Brady was a significant step toward making adversarial combat fairer, and it was part of a
trend towards liberalizing discovery on both sides. It indirectly promotes reliability by modestly
leveling the adversarial playing field, compensating a bit for prosecutors’ superior resources and
access to evidence. Brady could have meant much more, though. It could have portended a shift
away from adversarial combat at trial towards a joint search for guilt or innocence. Ultimately,
though, our proceduralized adversarial model has rendered Brady, if not a dead letter, not a very
vigorous one either. Judges are too weak, prosecutors are too partisan, enforcement is too
difficult, discovery is too limited, and plea bargains are too widespread for Brady to influence
many cases. Brady remains an important symbol but in some ways a hollow one.
One can only speculate about whether Brady’s activism contributed to its failings. When
the Court creates a sweeping new rule, without the benefit of common-law experimentation, it
cannot know how the rule will fare in practice. The Court could instead have let courts,
74The Supreme Court has left open the possibility that "a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’"
might itself trigger a due process right to federal habeas relief, even without any other procedural error. But even if
the Constitution guarantees such a due process right, the standard is an extremely high one that defendants will
rarely satisfy. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
75See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (confining the police duty to preserve evidence to "those cases
in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the
defendant.").

22

STEPHANOS BIBAS

legislatures, and the bar experiment with more workable rules and enforcement mechanisms.
Perhaps, if it had, Brady would have had more impact on our adversary system. Justice White’s
concurrence may have been prescient after all.

